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Applying Pen Register and Trap and Trace Devices .o Internet Cormmnunications
A Wiretps
(1) Supreme Court Decisions
on Wiretaps
Before pen register and trap and trace devices
were developed, law enforcement agents used wiretaps to
capture the real-time content of telephone calls. These
devices need not be placed inside an individual's home or
office. 0 They may be attached to the telephone line at
other points and still provide surveillance officers with the
ability to hear the actual conversations taking place on the
phones. I 
Olmstead v. United States 2 was the first Supreme
Court case to rule on the constitutionality of obtaining
evidence-without a warrant-via a telephone wiretap.
The wiretapped telephone conversations enabled federal
agents to identify Olmstead's partners in the (then) unlaw-
ful possession, transportation and sale
of liquor. "3 The wiretaps were placed
without physically entering the opera-
tion's headquarters. 14
The Olmstead majority held
that the Fourth Amendment does not
protect telephone calls since overhear-
ing them does not disturb or invade
the speakers' property.'" "The Amend-
ment itself shows that the search is to
be of material things -- the person, the
house, his papers or his effects. The
description of the warrant necessary
to make the proceeding lawful, is that it
must specify the place to be searched
and the person or things to be seized" I6
Sealed mail, the court reasoned, sent under protection of
the federal government, is a thing protected by the Fourth
Amendment from unlawful seizure. '7 A telephone call,
however, placed "voluntarily" and "overheard", is not simi-
larly protected. 8
The dissenting opinion, written by Justice Brandeis,
focused on whether the wiretapping done by government
agents constituted an unreasonable search and seizure. Even
the government conceded that if wiretapping constituted a
search and seizure, wiretapping without a warrant would be
unlawful. '9 Rejecting the government's argument that the
Fourth Amendment "cannot properly be held to" protect
telephone conversations, 20 Brandeis stressed that "clauses
guaranteeing to the individual protection against specific
abuses of power, must have a similar capacity of adaptation
to a changing world: 2' Simply because the telephone did
not exist when the Fourth Amendment was drafted did not
mean that telephone conversations could not possibly be
protected by the same. 22 Brandeis quoted Boyd v. United
States, 116 U.S. 616, 627-630 (1885), in which the history of
the Fourth and Fifth Amendments was reviewed:
It is not the breaking of his doors, and
the rummaging of his drawers, that consti-
tutes the essence of the offence; but it is
the invasion of his indefeasible right of per-
sonal security, personal liberty and private
property, where that right has never
been forfeited by his conviction of some
public offence -- it is the invasion of this
sacred right which underlies and consti-
tutes the essence of Lord Camden's judg-
ment. Breaking into a house and opening
boxes and drawers are circumstances of
aggravation; but any forcible and compul-
sory extortion of a man's own testimony
or of his private papers to be used as evi-
dence of a crime or to forfeit his goods, is
within the condemnation of that judgment.
In this regard the Fourth and Fifth Amend-
ments run almost into each other.23
Brandeis' dissent laid the foundation for the decision in
Katz v. United States2 4 that eventually overruled Olmstead.
Mr. Katz was suspected of violating a federal stat-
ute that prohibited transmitting betting information across
state lines via telephone.2" To catch him in the act, federal
authorities placed a listening and recording device on top of
a telephone booth from which Katz regularly made calls.26 The
device did not intercept telephone conversations; instead,
it amplified the sounds within the booth and transmitted
them to officers listening nearby. 27
Since by this time the Court had held that oral
statements as well as tangible items may be "seized" within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, 28 the Court found
the eavesdropping methods employed by the government
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without a warrant constituted a search, and that the search
was improper. 29 The Court emphasized that the Fourth
Amendment protects individuals rather than "protected
areas:' and declared the "trespass" doctrine of Olmstead
no longer controlling. 10 Whether the wall of the telephone
booth was penetrated by the listening device, the Court
explained,"can have no constitutional significance." 3'
Katz illustrates the Court's ability to rectify rules
that were easily manipulated. Federal agents, attempting
to meet the Olmstead standard, conducted surveillance that
did not involve a physical trespass. 32 The Katz majority
recognized that the Olmstead "trespass" doctrine had been
"eroded," and did not adequately protect individuals. 3 Jus-
tice Brandeis must have smiled, recognizing that the Court
was slowly coming around to the logic of his Olmstead dis-
sent: "A principle to be vital must be capable of wider appli-
cation than the mischief which gave it birth."34 Application
of constitutional principles, Brandeis insisted, must contem-
plate the past and the future." Otherwise, those princi-
ples defining what constitute Fourth Amendment violations
in surveillance "would have little value and be converted
by precedent into impotent and lifeless formulas. Rights
declared in words might be lost in reality."36
The standard outlined by Justice Harlan in his con-
curring opinion formed the basis for analysis of surveil-
lance activities over the next several decades. It was Justice
Harlan who explained that the Fourth Amendment pro-
tects people, not places, from interference with their rea-
sonable expectations of privacy: "My understanding of the
rule that has emerged from prior decisions is that there is
a twofold requirement, first that a person have exhibited
an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second,
that the expectation be one that society is prepared to
recognize as 'reasonable."' 7 Conversations conducted in
the presence of others would not be protected from being
overheard, "for the expectation of privacy under the cir-
cumstances would be unreasonable" 38 Applying this stan-
dard to Katz, Harlan said:
The critical fact in this case is that "one
who occupies [a telephone booth] shuts
the door behind him, and pays the toll that
permits him to place a call is surely entitled
to assume" that his conversation is not
being intercepted. The point is not that
the booth is "accessible to the public" at
other times, but that it is a temporarily pri-
vate place whose momentary occupants'
expectations of freedom from intrusion
are recognized as reasonable.3 9
(2) Federal Legislation on Wiretaps
UnderTitle III of the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act of 1968,40 wiretaps may only be used in
investigation of certain offenses. 4' Court orders are only
issued after an application is submitted that states facts
showing"probable cause for belief that an individual is com-
mitting, has committed, or is about to commit a particular
offense, ... [and] probable cause for belief that particular
communications concerning that offense will be obtained
through such interception." "42 The judge must also deter-
mine, "on the basis of the facts submitted by the applicant,"
that alternative means of obtaining the information have
been exhausted.43 Court orders identify the specific com-
munications that law enforcement officers hope to inter-
cept, the target of their surveillance and the government
agency allowed to conduct the surveillance.44 Orders also
require the surveillance cease once the described informa-
tion has been obtained, 4 and the surveillance cannot last
longer than 30 days without specific approval for extension.'
B. Pen Registers and
Trap and Trace Devices
(1) Supreme Court Decisions
on Pen Registers
and Trap and Trace Devices
Unlike wiretaps, pen register and trap and trace
mechanisms only capture the telephone numbers an indi-
vidual dials or the number of persons calling the target of
surveillance. The Supreme Court held in United States
v. New York Telephone Co. that pen registers were not cov-
ered by Title III since they do not intercept the content
of communications. 47 Pen register devices (and trap and
trace devices, since their function is identical for incoming
calls) "disclose only the telephone numbers that have been
dialed. 48
In another case two years later, the Court articu-
lated a clear analogy to e-mail addresses and IP addresses.
A pen register was installed on Michael Lee Smith's tele-
phone line as part of the investigation of a robbery.49 The
pen register brought evidence to light that led to a search
warrant. 50 The subsequent search uncovered evidence
leading to Smith's arrest."' The Supreme Court held that
no reasonable expectation of privacy existed in the num-
bers a person dials on his or her telephone, because that
information is recorded by telephone companies for busi-
ness purposes.5 2 The court rejected Smith's claim of expec-
tation of privacy:
Pen registers are regularly employed "to
determine whether a home phone is being
used to conduct a business, to check for a
defective dial, or to check for overbilling"
... Telephone users, in sum, typically know
that they must convey numerical informa-
tion to the phone company; that the phone
company has facilities for recording this
information; and that the phone company
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does in fact record this information for
a variety of legitimate business purposes.
Although subjective expectations cannot
be scientifically gauged, it is too much to
believe that telephone subscribers, under
these circumstances, harbor any general
expectation that the numbers they dial will
remain secret. "
In other words, since the dialer voluntarily pro-
vides that information to the telephone company, he or she
cannot expect that it is private information: "Therefore, the
pen register did not constitute a search and no warrant was
necessary." 14
(2) Federal Legislation on Pen Registers
and Trap and Trace Devices
Worried about the potential for abuse that the
Smith ruling created, Congress increased protection for
electronic communications by passing the Electronic Com-
munications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA)," which modified
Title Ill, requiring the government to meet higher standards
before it may conduct electronic surveillance.
The standard for obtaining pen register or trap
and trace orders is lower than that for obtaining wiretap
orders. To lawfully use a pen register or trap and trace
device, law enforcement officers need only certify to the
court that the information likely to be obtained is relevant
to an ongoing criminal investigation. 56
Following the terrorist attacks on the United States
on September I I, 2001, legislators attached provisions to
several pending anti-terrorist bills that explicitly extended
pen register and trap and trace orders to Internet commu-
nications. In addition to provisions specifically intended to
aid law enforcement officers in investigating terrorists, the
USA PATRIOT Act, passed in October, 200 I17 amended the
pen register and trap and trace statutes to include Inter-
net communications:58 "[T]he term 'pen register' means a
device or process which records or decodes dialing, routing,
addressing, or signaling information transmitted by an instru-
ment or facility from which a wire or electronic commu-
nication is transmitted." 19 An expanded definition of a
"trap and trace device" also emerged:"a device or process
which captures the incoming electronic or other impulses
which identify the originating number or other dialing, rout-
ing, addressing, and signaling information reasonably likely to
identify the source of a wire or electronic communica-
tion." 60 The only change to the law was the addition of the
words "routing, addressing and signaling" In other words,
the law does not allow for capture of any content of elec-
tronic messages, including e-mail or web browsing.
A. How Information is Transmitted
Via the Internet
With telephone lines, separating the numbers from
the content of conversations is relatively easy. Internet
communications are transmitted in a way that makes sepa-
rating addressing information from content more difficult.
Information to be sent over the Internet is first broken
into in multiple packets, which find their way across the
Internet.6' These packets contain headers, which use num-
bers as addresses to identify the sending machine and the
machine to which the information is being sent. "Each data
packet consists of two components. One component is the
address information, which appears in the packet's header
and, like an envelope address, ensures that the communica-
tion arrives at the proper location and is reassembled in the
correct sequence. The second component is the body, or
payload of the communication, which contains the commu-
nication's content." 62 Assuming that e-mail messages and
Internet addresses ("URLs") are like telephone numbers, it
is obvious that collecting only the "numbers" is more dif-
ficult with Internet communications than with telephone
communications. Collection must be limited to the infor-
mation in the header.
B. Monitoring E-mail and
Web Browsing
To obtain authorization for a pen register or trap
and trace device on Internet communications, the United
States Attorney or state law enforcement officer must cer-
tify to the court "that the information likely to be obtained
by such installation and use is relevant to an ongoing crim-
inal investigation"' 63 Only after receiving a court order
must the communication provider assist the law enforce-
ment officers in installing the device. 64 The court order
must specify the owner of the telephone line or"other facil-
ity" (such as a dial-up, DSL or cable connection to an Inter-
net Service Provider), the identity of "the person who is the
subject of the criminal investigation" the alleged offense to
which the information sought relates, and "the attributes of
the communications to which the order relates:' 65 These
"attributes" must include the telephone number "or other
identifier" (such as the IP address of the computer sending
or receiving e-mail). 66 This enables the communication
provider, together with the law enforcement agency, to
ensure that persons other than those whose communica-
tions are to be monitored, do not have their e-mail or
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web surfing monitored. The pen register or trap and trace
device can be placed on the smallest subset of the Internet
Service Provider's (ISP's) network, and set to monitor only
a single machine.67 The collection must be limited to the
"header" containing the addressing information. Any infor-
mation in the "payload"--the content of the communica-
tions-may only be collected with wiretap authorization.
The agency conducting pen register or trap and trace sur-
veillance is required to use available technology that limits
the gathering of information to the addressing information
of Internet communications, and that specifically does not
include the contents of any e-mail or web browsing."
Scholars, practitioners and journalists are afraid
that, while supposedly only operating a pen register or trap
and trace device, the government would employ technol-
ogy that will gather too much information - an amount
of information that violates individual's reasonable expec-
tations of privacy and thereby the Fourth Amendment.
They worry that not only will the FBI find out that an
individual was e-mailing Bobjones@yahoo.com, but that
in the e-mail message was an invitation
for Bob to join in an illegal Internet
gaming web site operated from a web
site in the Bahamas. In PCWorld, Anne
Kandra wrote: "The new law, along
with new surveillance tools, will create
a dragnet wide enough that anyone's
e-mail note, text chat, or search inquiry
might be snared' 69 Kandra continues,
"When a suspect sends an e-mail mes-
sage, investigators could discover not
only the recipient's identity, but also the
subject line and perhaps even the body
of the message" 70 Rachel King, the legislative counsel at
the ACLU's national office, also said that the FBI plans to
"get access to [entire e-mail messages] and then separate
out the content information, which is an unconstitutional
extension of its power." 7 She noted that the government
is using surveillance technology for pen register and trap
and trace surveillance that "gives the FBI all the commu-
nications that run through the system, including those of
people who are not targets of the search:' 72
Co EYpectatio ns of P9 'va ~y 'n h
The FBI developed a tool for surveillance of Inter-
net traffic called "Carnivore." Carnivore, now known as
DCSI000, can function in two modes: full collection, in
which all addressing information and the content of elec-
tronic communications are intercepted, and pen collection
mode, in which only the addressing information from e-mail,
web browsing and file transfers is captured.7 3
This tool, created by the FBI, records information
that Internet Service Providers are already gathering-
routers, servers and other machines on Internet networks
record the IP addresses of the machines sending and receiv-
ing information across the Internet. The FBI secures court
orders to wiretap or use a pen register or trap and trace
device to track a specific individual by his or her IP address.
Then FBI technicians would work with ISP staff to make
sure that the monitoring and interception of communica-
tions is done in a manner that reduces the chances of them
also intercepting communications from users not under
surveillance.74
(1) Dr. 1 0 (T e k or er
An independent research group, the lIT Research
Institute, evaluated how DCS 1000 operated in full collec-
tion and pen register mode to determine whether or not
it would gather more information than law enforcement
officers had authorization to collect.7 This test revealed
that DCSIOOO did not collect the e-mail subject or con-
tents when in pen register mode. 6 When monitoring web
browsing, DCS1000 only collects the source and destina-
tion information. 7 7 The IP address-e.g., 124.4.24.5-of
the web server, which might translate to yahoo.com, would
be revealed, but the specific Uniform Resource Locator
(URL) would not.78 So the FBI might find out that a com-
puter had browsed to yahoo.com, but would not know that
once there, the user had entered "gambling in the Bahamas"
in a search field, or gone on to cuteboys.yahoo.com. 79
The IITRI report left some room for concern, how-
ever. DCS 1000 replaces e-mail header information with
"X"s, which would allow those monitoring to determine
the size of the header and the message." ° IITRI noted in
its report: "Recording this information might be an issue
of over-collecting because the court order only authorizes
collecting the IP addresses of web activity, but none of the
information on data size can be collected""1
(2) How DC I o
Internet users cannot reasonably maintain any
expectation of privacy in non-content information of Inter-
net communications, just as users of telephones do not
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the non-con-
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tent elements of their telephone communications. Like the
situation described in Smith,82 non-content information of
e-mail and web browsing is available to, and logged by, the
Internet Service Provider, in the normal course of business.
Users of free and pay services on the Internet have their
non-content information collected for the same purposes
that the telephone company collects telephone numbers
dialed. For example,Yahoo! provides e-mail, chat, web page
hosting and other services for free. The Terms of Service
(TOS) require users to agree not to use the service to
"harm minors:' "impersonate" other persons, upload con-
tent that would infringe copyrights or patents, send com-
puter viruses, etc.83 The user agreement further states:
You acknowledge and agree that
Yahoo may preserve Content and may also
disclose Content if required to do so by
law or in the good faith belief that such
preservation or disclosure is reasonably
necessary to: (a) comply with legal pro-
cess; (b) enforce the TOS; (c) respond to
claims that any Content violates the rights
of third-parties; or (d) protect the rights,
property, or personal safety of Yahoo, its
users and the public.'
Comcast, a provider of high-speed cable Internet services,
also collects user information:
Collecting information contained in
transmissions made by Customer through
the Service directed at Comcast, its Under-
lying Providers, Internet web sites, or other
service providers to which access is pro-
vided as part of the Service, is necessary
to provide the Service. Comcast's detailed
business records generally are used to help
make sure customers are properly billed;
to send customers pertinent information
about the Service; and for accounting pur-
poses.8
Two recent cases, relying on Smith (which relied on
New York Telephone), 86 support the notion that users do
not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the non-
content portions of Internet activity. In United States v.
Hambrick, 87 the defendant sent money to a police officer
posing as a young boy in a chat room, so the "boy" could
get on a bus and run away with Hambrick.88 A subpoena
was obtained and submitted to the ISP, which provided
Hambrick's name, billing address, IP address, credit card and
other information.89 Hambrick contended that the Fourth
Amendment protected this information, but the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit disagreed."'
The court noted that the ECPA "does not repre-
sent a legislative determination of a reasonable expectation
of privacy in non-content information released by ISPs;'
and was therefore inapplicable. It stated, "a person does
not have an interest in the account information given to the
ISP in order to establish the e-mail account, which is non-
content information" The court found that "when Ham-
brick entered into a service agreement with MindSpring,
he knowingly revealed this information to MindSpring and
its employees. The records that the government obtained
from MindSpring had been available to MindSpring employ-
ees in the normal course of business:' 92 Since Hambrick
disclosed this information to a third party, any expectation
of privacy was destroyed: "an individual has no Fourth
Amendment privacy interest in information released to a
third party and later conveyed by that third party to a gov-
ernmental entity,'even if the information is revealed on the
assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose
and the confidence placed in the third party will not be
betrayed" 93
The court went on to say that even though the
Internet and the "vast extent of communications it has ini-
tiated" are "'revolutionary, ... the information at issue in
this case is not distinguishable from the materials in Miller
and Smith, as the government merely obtained non-con-
tent information that was part of MindSpring's business
records' "
In another case, United States
v. Kennedy, 9' an anonymous caller
informed an ISP customer service oper-
ator that he had viewed files on a sub-
scriber's computer (identified by an IP
address) that he believed were child
pornography.96 A Road Runner net-
work engineer confirmed that the IP
address corresponded to one of Road
Runner's subscribers, the defendant
Kennedy, and examined files on the
hard drive of that computer (he did
so believing that the customer service
agreement authorized a search for
offensive material). 97 A Road Runner
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manager contacted the authorities later that day, after con-
sulting with the corporate attorney.98
The defendant claimed that his constitutional rights
were violated by Road Runner when it passed his sub-
scriber information to the authorities. " The United States
District Court for the District of Kansas disagreed: "When
defendant entered into an agreement with Road Runner
for Internet service, he knowingly revealed all information
connected to the IP address 24.94.200.54. He cannot now
claim to have a Fourth Amendment privacy interest in his
subscriber information" 100
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit cited Maxwell and Kennedy in declaring that users
who communicate their IP address or other identifying
information to system operators no longer have a reason-
able expectation of privacy:
Individuals generally lose a reason-
able expectation of privacy in their infor-
mation once they reveal it to third parties.
A bank customer, for instance, does not
have a legitimate expectation of privacy in
the information that he or she has con-
veyed to the bank; by placing the informa-
tion under control of a third party, the cus-
tomer assumes the risk that the bank will
convey the information to the government.
Courts have applied this principle to com-
puter searches and seizures to conclude
that computer users do not have a legiti-
mate expectation of privacy in their sub-
scriber information because they have con-
veyed it to another person--the system
operator. 101
Paul Taylor argues that e-mail addresses, unlike tele-
phone numbers, are more likely to reveal the identity of
the initiator of the communication. 102 Taylor suggests that
e-mail addresses should be more protected because they
are more likely to contain the name of the sender. 103 The
Supreme Court in New York Telephone, Taylor points out,
said that pen registers are not an "interception" of com-
munications (which would then make them subject to Title
Ill) because "[n]either the purport of any communication
between the caller and the recipient of the call, their identi-
ties, nor whether the call was even completed is disclosed
by pen registers." 104 Taylor's argument has two major
flaws, however. First, people can easily make their e-mail
addresses as anonymous as their telephone number. Noth-
ing prohibits someone from creating an e-mail address that
is completely numeric, or from having it contain a pseud-
onym. Second, Taylor argues that the likelihood of actual
association of the e-mail address with the individual should
increase the level of protection afforded e-mail addresses.
Applying this line of defense to telephone numbers would
mean that they should also not be obtainable via pen regis-
ter or trap and trace devices. That argument is not even
supported by New York Telephone. In that case, the Court
held only that because the identities of the individuals plac-
ing the calls could not be determined from the number,
Title III did not cover the pen register device. 105
fIll. Wh the PAT IOtc
A. Legislative History:
The Purpose of the USA PATRIOT Act
Senator Patrick Leahy, one of the PATRIOT Act's
sponsors, spoke of three main purposes he hoped to
accomplish with the Act's stipulations regarding pen regis-
ter and trap and trace device laws:
I have long supported modernizing the pen regis-
ter and trap and trace device laws by modifying the
statutory language to cover the use of these orders
on computer transmissions; to remove the juris-
dictional limits on service of these orders; and to
update the judicial review procedure, which, unlike
any other area in criminal procedure, bars the exer-
cise of judicial discretion in reviewing the justifica-
tion for the order. 106
The statutes, he explained, needed to be updated
because of the change in modes of communication-simple
technological advancement. '07 Nationwide jurisdictional
function of pen register and trap and trace orders was also
necessary because of the advancing technology: because
Internet communications travel over the networks of vari-
ous providers, requiring orders for installation at each pro-
vider, merely to cover the same communications, would be
a waste of time and resources. 108 Senator Leahy offered
the following illustration:
For example, a telephone call may be car-
ried by a competitive local exchange car-
rier, which passes it at a switch to a local
Bell Operating Company, which passes it
to a long distance carrier, which hands it to
an incumbent local exchange carrier else-
where in the U.S., which in turn may finally
hand it to a cellular carrier. If these carriers
do not pass source information with each
call, identifying that source may require
compelling information from a host of pro-
viders located throughout the country. 109
This kind of analysis of how the law works in reality is best
done by the legislature. '0
Senator Leahy offered two examples from Depart-
ment of Justice investigations to illustrate the difficulties
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that limiting jurisdiction on pen register and trap and trace
devices would create. In the first case, a hacker, based in a
foreign country, dialed into Harvard University computers
and used them as "an intermediate staging point to conceal
his location and identity" "' The local telephone company,
NYNEX, could only tell the investigators that the commu-
nications were coming from a long distance carrier, MCI. "12
By the time investigators applied for and received an order
to get the information from MCI, the hacker was no longer
using the connection, and MCI could no longer identify the
source. 113
In the second instance, Kevin Mitnick hacked into
computers while "on supervised release for a prior com-
puter crime conviction," and eluded investigators by con-
stantly moving around the country and using "cloned cel-
lular phones and other evasive techniques." 114 Mitnick's
"hacking attacks would often pass through one of two cel-
lular carriers, a local telephone company, and then two
Internet service providers." ''5 Only because of Mitnick's
persistent hacking were investigators able to trace his activ-
ity through "repeated attempts accompanied by an order
to each service provider." 1 6 As Leahy noted, having to
obtain separate orders for "each link in the communica-
tions chain" is time consuming. 117 He also pointed out
that:
[Requiring separate orders] serves no
useful purpose since the original court has
already authorized the trace. Moreover,
a second or third order addressed to a
particular carrier that carried part of a
prior communication may prove useless
during the next attack: in computer intru-
sion cases, for example, the target may use
an entirely different path, i.e., utilize a dif-
ferent set of intermediate providers, for his
or her subsequent activity. 118
B. The Danger of Hurried Legislation:
Is Congress Too Slow to Correct
Its Own Mistake?
An additional danger exists that because legislation
like the USA PATRIOT Act may be passed as a quick fix to a
"new" problem "unique" to the Internet (or passed, as the
PATRIOT Act, in the wake of an emergency), "19 it is more
likely to be flawed or quickly outdated. One might argue
that courts are in a better position-relying on the Consti-
tution and precedent-to safeguard the rights of individuals
against unlawful searches and seizures than the legislature
is or will be.
Professor Suzanna Sherry argues that courts are
clearly in a better position to adapt law to changing technol-
ogy than the legislature. 120 Sherry explains that when tech-
nology creates "new" legal issues, there are two options
available: allow the courts to handle these situations and
let legislation fill in gaps, or quickly pass legislation to fix
the problem. 2' These legislative "quick fixes", she notes,
are shortsighted and produce long-term damage. 122 Laws
passed to deal with issues relating to the Internet have
already been repealed because of their unconstitutionality
(such as the Communications Decency Act). 123 Sherry
argues that other laws, though perhaps not unconstitu-
tional, are clearly shortsighted, such as E-SIGN and the
Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (ACPA). 24
When faced with changing computer technology
and its legal implications, Sherry suggests that the best
approach is to let the courts piece together a coherent
response, rather than legislate immediately: "[A]t least in
the context of new computer technology, allowing time for
incremental judicial responses is often superior to instant
legislative solutions of a global nature" 125 One of the
benefits of this approach, Sherry argues, is that even if a
few, or several courts "get it wrong," their reach will be
limited geographically. 126 The legislature's "mistakes" on
the other hand, have national, and often global effect. 127
However, the national and global effect of a "mis-
take" by the courts may also be severe. If the Court
determines that certain communications are not pro-
tected by the Fourth Amendment, the only way society
has to have their reasonable expectations considered
(when they conflict with the reasonable expectations of
the Supreme Court justices) is to persuade the Court
to overrule itself, or to get a constitutional amendment.
Senator Patrick Leahy, in his comments to Con-
gress, expressed concern about the lack of definitions that
may cause problems in the future. Because it does not
define terms such as "routing" and "addressing", the Act
leaves "the courts with little or no guidance of what is cov-
ered" by those terms. 28 Leahy also argued that simply
saying that the pen register and trap and trace devices
cannot intercept "content" was insufficient and short-
sighted. 129 The government and law enforcement agencies
then run the risk that a court, forced to rely on its own
definition of "routing" and "addressing information", may
declare all information derived based on the pen register
or trap and trace device-including subsequently collected
evidence-inadmissible. "3
The application of pen register and trap and trace
devices to Internet communications, however, does not
suffer the same problems as the laws Sherry criticizes.
This is not a "quick fix" that suffers from constitutional
problems. These surveillance methods have already been
found constitutional. Courts developed the law surround-
ing the surveillance of electronic communications, moving
from eavesdropping to wiretaps to pen register and trap
and trace devices. At each stage, Congress then filled gaps
and/or codified the common law with statutes. Following
common law analogies and precedent, the PATRIOT Act
applied pen register and trap and trace laws to the Inter-
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net.
The PATRIOT Act amendments to the pen register
and trap and trace device laws were sorely needed. In a
comment written before the PATRIOT Act was introduced,
Graham B. Smith said:
In general, reliance on outmoded statutes to
govern a new electronic medium imposes
constitutional threats. Carnivore's exis-
tence confirms Internet users' Orwellian
fears, and law enforcement agencies are
permitted to exploit loopholes in current
surveillance law until Congress fortifies
Fourth Amendment privacy rights with
internet-specific legislation. No other com-
munications technology retains infinite per-
sonal information through such progres-
sive communications services. Therefore,
Congress needs to disregard the DOJ's
plea for technology-neutral legislation and
embark on new surveillance regulations for
the Internet. 3 '
The limited case of applying pen register and trap
and trace devices to Internet communications 132 was not
the kind of "quick fix" Sherry feared. Outdated statutes
were constricting courts. Consider the following situation,
before the PATRIOT Act amendments to ECPA:A suspect
uses e-mail to communicate with a co-conspirator. He uses
a dial-up connection to the Internet. The police would be
able, via a pen register, to discover the number he dialed
to connect to the Internet. But, they would have had to
collect more than "dialing" information to determine with
whom the suspect was communicating. The "dialing" infor-
mation would only have led them to the local server that
connected the suspect to the Internet. Suppose they used
DCS 1000 to find out the e-mail address. Collection of
the e-mail address from the ISP would not have been
authorized by the pen register order. So even though the
Supreme Court had determined that information "volun-
tarily" disclosed to third parties was not protected by the
Fourth Amendment, 33 it may have suppressed the evidence
because of the means used to obtain the e-mail address
(at the time, ECPA only allowed the collection of "dialing"
information). As Mark Elmore explained:
With the FBI's implementation of DCS 1000,
the need for Congress to amend existing
statutes becomes increasingly more impor-
tant. ... Without uniform changes to stat-
utes like the ECPA, the FBI may deploy
DCSI000, in varying degrees of threat to
privacy rights, depending on a particular
court's interpretation of statutes and how
varying forms of electronic communica-
tions fall within them....
Until changes occur which modify the cur-
rent statutory protections or bring about a
broader interpretation of the Katz privacy
doctrine, courts will continue to address
challenges involving Internet communica-
tions with judicial precedent and statutes
not necessarily written to conform with
modern technology. Courts will be forced
to determine the impact of technology like
DCS 1000 on privacy rights by applying the
current statutory framework to advancing
technology. To better protect the privacy
rights of individuals in the 21st century,
Congress must amend existing legislation
to properly address Internet communica-
tions rather than relying on the judiciary to
divine Congress's intent from statutes that
were drafted before the widespread use of
Internet communications. 134
The modifications of the pen register and trap
and trace laws were also not complete statutes trying to
create a new "law of the Internet." Instead the PATRIOT
Act amendments merely modified an existing statute to
enable law enforcement agencies to keep up with changing
peer-to-peer communication, in a manner consistent with
Supreme Court Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
As noted above, the PATRIOT Act does not allow
untargeted individuals' communications to be monitored.
Contrary to Anna Kandra's comments, 3 the body of
e-mails and Internet search terms would not be discover-
able under a pen register order. 136 Additionally, the Act
provides for significant reporting, both to the Court issuing
the order, 137 and, on a yearly basis, to Congress for analysis. 
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A. Reasonable Analogies? How Nine
People Can Reduce "Society's"
Expectations of Privacy
The Supreme Court, in its own jurisprudence in
surveillance cases, has created a standard that Congress is
in a better position to apply than the Court itself. In Katz,
the Court set forth two requirements to establish a Fourth
Amendment violation: first, the individual must exhibit an
expectation of privacy, and second, that expectation must
be one that society must be ready to recognize as reason-
able. 139 justice Harlan tried to create a clear standard,
however, the standard outlined may be, and in fact has
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been, easily manipulated. In Smith, Justice Marshall warned
that "law enforcement officials, simply by announcing their
intent to monitor the content of random samples of first-
class mail or private phone conversations, could put the
public on notice of the risks they would thereafter assume
in such situations" 
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The legislature can provide protection beyond that
required by the Fourth Amendment. Perhaps the Court
recognized that the legislature would be able to take advan-
tage of the standard it created. And perhaps the Court
created the standard with that end in mind. Ric Simmons
notes that ECPA did just that. 14' ECPA has "a low stan-
dard for intercepting the Internet version of pen registers
... [and] trap and trace devices:' but a higher standard for
intercepting the Internet version of wiretaps. 142 A pen reg-
ister order, issued on a showing of relevance to an ongo-
ing investigation, 141 would be sufficient only for the collec-
tion of addressing information; but a wiretap authorization,
based on a showing of probable cause, '4 would be neces-
sary to obtain the content of any e-mail or web browsing
information. 141
Simmons argues that the post-Katz cases strayed
from an important part of the standard Justice Harlan
emphasized, namely, "that 'physical intrusiveness' should no
longer be the controlling factor in determining whether or
not a search had occurred." 146 By focusing on the methods
used by the government in cases like Kyllo, 141 the Supreme
Court creates inconsistencies that Simmons suggests, will
only increase "as technologies become more sophisticated
and courts struggle to find the correct analogy for any given
surveillance method employed by the government." 148 Sim-
mons outlines the problems courts face relying on analo-
gies:
In some cases, courts are forced to choose
between equally plausible analogies in order
to determine how the Fourth Amendment
applies: is thermal imaging analogous to
watching snow melt off a roof or is it more
like using binoculars? Or perhaps it is most
analogous to using a dog to detect the
odor of illegal contraband? Is reading the
content of an e-mail analogous to wiretap-
ping a phone, or is it analogous to access-
ing a stored voicemail? Or perhaps reading
the content of an e-mail is comparable to
reading the content of regular mail? And
frequently courts must stack analogy on
top of analogy: if reading the content of an
e-mail is analogous to wiretapping a phone,
we need another analogy to determine
whether the founders would think wire-
tapping violates the Fourth Amendment-
-is wiretapping a phone the equivalent of
standing outside a window and listening
to a private conversation, or is it more
like standing inside the room listening to
the conversation? These inquiries become
less and less relevant (and more and more
metaphysical) as we move further into the
realm of cyber-investigations and the use
of devices that detect information that is
invisible to the human ear or eye. The
only relevant consideration is the result of
the surveillance: what information does the
government acquire as a result of making
the observations? 149
Because Congress does not have to rely on potentially
inconsistent analogies to make law, but instead can under-
take exhaustive investigations and studies by experts and
gather constituent viewpoints, Congress is in the best posi-
tion, through statutes, to do just what the Court said was
necessary in Katz: protect those expectations of privacy
"that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable" 10
And when those expectations change, "society" can pass
legislation through Congress that reflects those changes.
"Society" is not in a position, however, to change Supreme
Court determinations of reasonableness.
B. What's a Bootstrap and Can My
Congressman Get Me One?
Why Congressional Action is just
What the People Ordered
In a New York Times article discussing the then-
pending USA PATRIOT Act, Stewart Baker, who heads the
technology practice at Steptoe & Johnson, a law firm in
Washington, D.C., said: "I think if you asked anyone on the
street:'Which would you rather reveal, the telephone num-
bers you dialed or a list of all the people you sent e-mail to
and the Web sites you visited?' I think they'd say, 'Go with
the phone numbers." " Unfortunately for "anyone on the
street," their opinion doesn't matter to the courts. The
Supreme Court decides, placing itself in the role of "soci-
ety", which expectations of privacy are reasonable. 512 This
test of "reasonableness" is, of course, problematic.
Erik Luna argues that the reasonableness standard
actually provides room for more government surveillance,
rather than serving as a high barrier the government must
overcome to legitimize its surveillance of individuals: 153
'Reasonableness' might be the law's great-
est waffle word, allowing courts to hedge
their bets or duck principled analysis. In
the criminal procedure context, a reason-
ableness standard is flexible and simple,
but also manipulable, terribly ambiguous,
and subject to inconsistency. The Fourth
Amendment reasonableness test contains
the vice of degenerative self-definition,
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with each unimpeded intrusion providing a
new baseline against which all subsequent
modes of government surveillance will be
measured. As a test, it provides a near-
perfect bootstrap for incrementally more
intrusive police actions. 114
Luna suggests that each time the court approves a
government intrusion by the Katz reasonableness standard,
even by a theory which initially strikes citizens as odd (like
saying that since consumers "voluntarily" report the tele-
phone numbers they dial to the telephone company, they
can't reasonably expect those numbers to remain private),
"a new, lower baseline of privacy" is created, "allowing
gradual deterioration of Fourth Amendment protection." 155
Luna is concerned by language like that used in Kyllo, where
the Court noted that a search was unconstitutional "at
least where (as here) the technology in question is not in
general public use." 15' So to guarantee that use of certain
devices is constitutional, the government could, according
to the Kyllo case, make sure that devices it wants to use are
well publicized and sold to the general public.
As Justice Brandeis noted,"Clauses guaranteeing to
the individual protection against specific abuses of power,
must have a similar capacity of adaptation to a changing
world" 157 Simply because the telephone did not exist when
the Fourth Amendment was drafted does not mean that
telephone conversations cannot possibly be protected by
the same. 158 Advancing technology is allowing the govern-
ment to monitor activity it could not previously monitor
without invading the home. The constitutional protections
against abuses of power should adapt to this changing envi-
ronment.
However, the question raised by the debate over
application of pen register and trap and trace orders to
Internet communications is whether that adaptation should
go in both directions. Should the government no longer
be able to monitor certain activities because technology
has allowed individuals to conduct those activities in the
privacy of their home? Should it matter that government
monitoring of these activities was previously not consid-
ered a violation of people's reasonable expectations of pri-
vacy because they previously had been conducted exclu-
sively in plain view? Years ago, in order to get the latest
Cabbage Patch Kid doll, or to view child pornography, or
conduct stock fraud, a person would have to go the physi-
cal K-Mart store, visit the neighborhood adult bookstore,
make several telephone calls, or send letters through the
mail. Now, all of those things can be done from the privacy
of a person's home.
In the case of pen register and trap and trace
orders being applied to e-mail and Internet communica-
tions, however, commentators are making a different argu-
ment. In effect, commentators like Stewart Baker, Anne
Kandra and others are complaining that since people have
changed the means by which they communicate or shop,
those activities should now receive greater protection. In
other words, they are not lamenting a bootstrapping tech-
nique being employed by the Supreme Court, but are claim-
ing that society's reasonable expectations have changed,
and should therefore change in the eyes of the Supreme
Court justices.
Examining one of the arguments against applying
the existing pen register and trap and trace statutes to
e-mail reveals how acceptance of them would actually sig-
nificantly undermine the jurisprudence on pen registers
and trap and trace devices as applied to the telephone.
People have expressed concern that separating content
from addressing information in e-mail and Internet com-
munications is so much more difficult than doing so with
telephone calls that the same rules should not apply. "59 But,
since many telephone calls are now being routed via a tech-
nology called Voice Over IP (VolP), which sends telephone
calls in packets just like e-mail is sent over the Internet, 160
separating telephone numbers from the content of tele-
phone calls will be just as cumbersome and fraught with
the same potential for abuse. If pen register and trap and
trace devices cannot apply to "Internet communications,"
they would not be applicable to telephone calls sent via
VoIP either (and these telephone calls may soon constitute
a majority of all calls)!
The fear expressed by Brandeis in his Olmstead dis-
sent, and the concerns raised by commentators like Erik
Luna, are worries that the government will use advancing
technology to intrude upon activities it could not previ-
ously have monitored without violating the Fourth Amend-
ment. People alarmed by application of pen register and
trap and trace orders to Internet communications are now
- whether they realize it or not - arguing that activities
previously deemed unprotected by the Fourth Amend-
ment, should now be protected from government surveil-
lance. These arguments are legitimate, but the Fourth
Amendment should not, and, based on substantial prece-
dent, cannot provide those protections. Our current use
of the Internet to send mail and conduct other transactions
we used to engage in over the telephone or by going out
to a store should not be grounds for providing protections
no previous generation has enjoyed. Technological changes
should not be allowed to enable the general public to hide
from the government any more than they should allow
the government to abuse our Fourth Amendment rights.
If people have decided that they want the e-mail and IP
addresses of places they visit on the Internet (the equiva-
lent of physical, "brick and mortar" stores) to have more
protection than the telephone numbers they dial or the
addresses of buildings they visit, that is fine. But those
protections will have to be provided by Congress, not the
Supreme Court.
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Congress is in a better position to make laws cov-
ering the privacy of communications that keep up with
changing technology while also protecting Fourth Amend-
ment rights. The USA PATRIOTAct amended existing stat-
utes to explicitly define when and how pen register and
trap and trace orders may be obtained for Internet com-
munications in a manner consistent with Supreme Court
jurisprudence and existing statutes. The application of pen
register and trap and trace laws to Internet communica-
tions, as amended by the Act, illustrates how Congress is in
the best position to protect "society's" reasonable expecta-
tions of privacy as technology changes the way we live our
lives.
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